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Abstract 
The vision of an economic and monetary union came to be realized within three stages. The 
limitations for capital movements were removed, the Economic Monetary Institute was 
founded and when the convergence criteria were met, the joint currency was launched. Italy 
did not pass the debt criterion to enter into the third stage of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) but passed all the other criteria and was accepted. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was founded in 1997 to strengthen the budgetary 
surveillance of countries within the EMU. It consisted of two Council regulations and a 
Council resolution.  
In 2005 the SGP was reformed and from that point a lot clearer to interpret. For example, it 
had been hard to interpret the importance of the Other Relevant Factors (ORF) and which to 
include in the decision making of an excessive deficit with the unreformed SGP but after 
2005 there were clear guidelines to follow.  
The same year as the reformation the Commission filed a report regarding Italy, the state had 
a deficit above the 3% reference value and might have an excessive deficit. The Commission 
found that the deficit was neither temporary nor exceptional which suggested that the deficit 
criterion of the SGP was not fulfilled. They also found that the debt ratio was not sufficiently 
diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace and thereby they did 
not fulfil the debt criterion. The Commission was of the opinion that there existed an 
excessive deficit in Italy. The Council was of the same opinion and gave Italy strong 
recommendations to follow for a correction of the excessive deficit.  
In 2006 and 2008, two follow-up reports about action taken by Italy for the correction was 
sent from the Commission to the Council. The first one found that there was no meaning to 
continue the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and the second one, sent in 2008, was about 
an abrogation of the decision of the existence of an excessive deficit in 2005. The Council 
also carried this out.  
No more than a year after the abrogation a new process started and Italy was once again 
found with an excessive deficit. The EDP was anew in full action. In a report in 2010 the 
Commission found that Italy had under the circumstances, amongst other the widely spread 
economic downturn, taken the adequate action for a correction of the excessive deficit within 
its time limit. The Council once again agreed and no further steps of the EDP were taken at 
this stage. 
Italy has, under the entire time period presented in this paper, failed to reach the debt and 
deficit criteria and have been acted on in accordance with the SGP. The changes or 
clarifications if you rather call it that, of the SGP has been of major help to the Commission 
and Council in their opinions, decisions and recommendations regarding the existence of an 
excessive deficit and its correction. Without the changes, the outcome for Italy might have 
been different. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the essay 
If you have been watching the news for the last couple of years you can hardly have missed 
the sovereign debt crisis and the commotion around the most economically troubled 
countries gathered under the acronym PIGS (i.e. Portugal, Ireland Greece and Spain). The 
television has produced pictures of people in Greece raging, protesting against their 
government and the acute reforms necessary to put their country’s economy on the right 
track again. Statesmen and economists from the EU countries have been frowning their 
foreheads and giving troubled speeches and demands for the government to take measures.  
Recently the PIGS acronym has been spelled PIIGS since one of Europe’s largest economies 
and one of the most indebted ones, has entered into the spotlight, namely Italy. The country’s 
economy has been in the shadows, hiding behind its charismatic leader and his personal 
scandals and outbursts. Now it is in the open for the entire world to see and it is not a 
particularly pretty sight. With a public debt of over 125 % of the GDP in 2010 according to 
the OECD country statistical profile7 and a low growth rate, people are starting to realise that 
Italy will have a difficult time paying the debt. This creates further turbulence to the already 
troubled market. 
Italy’s debt problem is not a new one; for more than ten years the state have had a gross 
government debt over 100% of GDP. Italy entered the third stage of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1998 without managing the debt criteria from the Maastricht 
treaty. Around the same time the state signed the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and 
promised to follow its regulations and procedures to keep a stable monetary union.  
The fact that Italy entered into the union without fulfilling all criteria necessary made me 
curious to see how they have been doing economically in regard to the regulations and 
procedures of the SGP. That is the reason why I chose Italy as the state in focus of this paper. 
The SGP was reformed in 2005 due to both external and internal criticism. I wanted to see 
the changes and their impact on how states are evaluated regarding excessive deficit.  
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to look at the SGP and Italy during a period of time and to view 
Italy’s economical situation in regard to the SGP and find out whether the changes made in 
the SGP in 2005 are being implemented in the handling of Italy. 
1.3 Delimitation 
Since this paper only has room to scratch the surface of the subject at hand, there has to be 
some limitations. I have decided to limit this paper to the years 2005-2010.    
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1.4 Sources and Methods 
This is a theoretical study and the sources are in majority from the Official sites of the 
European Union and the communications and publications from several of its organs.  
1.5 Structure 
The first part of this paper will give a small introduction to the EMU, and the SGP. There 
will be a section explaining the resolution and regulations in the SGP and also showing the 
changes made in the reformation in 2005. There is also a mentioning of how well Italy 
fulfilled the criteria to enter into the EMU. 
The second part includes an abbreviation of the reports and decisions made by the 
Commission and Council from 2005 to 2010. 
The third part includes a conclusion, which tells us if the changes made in the SGP 2005 
reformation have been implemented upon Italy. In the third part there is also a short 
discussion on whether Italy would have been acted on in a different manner should the SGP 
not have been reformed. 
2 The Stability and Growth Pact, original and reformed 
2.1 The start of the third stage of the EMU 
As can be seen below in a shortened extract from the publication The road to EMU1 on the 
European Commissions website, the pursuit of an economic and monetary union within the 
EU came to fulfilment in three stages.  
The first stage involved taking away the limitations for capital movements. In November 
1993 this stage was accomplished in most of the member countries. 
The second stage was the establishment of the Economic Monetary Institute (EMI), which 
was a predecessor of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
In 1998 a formal decision was announced exposing the eleven EU-countries that would be 
the original members of the third stage of the EMU. The membership had its foundation in 
the convergence criteria and for a country to enter the third stage of the European Monetary 
Union the criteria needed to be fulfilled. At the beginning of the next page there is a table 
showing what was measured, how it was measured and the convergence criteria. 
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Table 11. Source: The European Commission. (2011) Who can join and when? Slightly altered to fit the paper. 
 
When the convergence criteria were met, the third stage started. In January 1999, the joint 
currency, the Euro, was launched. The members’ exchange rates were locked towards each 
other and the responsibility for the monetary and currency policy was now in the hands of 
the ECB.  
At the end of the year 2002 the Euro had replaced the national currencies. 
2.2 Italy passing the criteria to enter into the EMU 
Italy joined the third stage of the EMU at its start in 1998 and regarding its fulfilment of the 
convergence criteria there is an extraction from the 98/317/EC Council decision3 below:  
“- The average inflation rate in Italy in the year ending in January 1998 stood at 1.8%, which 
is below the reference value. 
-Italy is not the subject of a council decision on the existence of an excessive government 
deficit. 
-Italy rejoined the ERM in November 1996; in the period from March 1996 to November 
1996, the Italian Lira appreciated vis-à-vis the ERM, the ITL has not been subject to severe 
tensions and Italy has not devalued, on its own initiative, the ITL bilateral central rate against 
any other Member States currency. 
-In the year ending in January 1998, the long-term interest rate in Italy was, on average, 
6.7% which is below the reference value.” 
With this, the Council concludes that Italy fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption of 
the single currency. 
 
What is 
measured: 
Price 
stability 
Sound public 
finances 
Sustainable 
public 
finances 
Durability of 
convergence 
Exchange rate 
stability 
How it is 
measured: 
Consumer 
price 
inflation 
rate 
Government 
deficit as % of 
GDP 
Government 
debt as % of 
GDP 
Long-term 
interest rate 
Deviation from a 
central rate 
Convergence 
criteria: 
Not more 
than 1.5 
percentage 
points 
above the 
rate of the 
three best 
performing 
Member 
States 
Reference 
value: not 
more than 3% 
Reference 
value: not 
more than 
60% 
Not more than 2 
percentage 
points above the 
rate of the three 
best performing 
Member States 
in terms of price 
stability 
Participation in 
ERM II for at least 2 
years without severe 
tensions 
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2.3 The Resolution and Regulations in the original Stability and Growth Pact 
The stability and Growth Pact was adopted in 1997 and consisted of two European Council 
regulations and a European Council resolution. The purpose was to give more detailed rules 
and procedures for budgetary surveillance for the countries within the Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
2.3.1 The Council Resolution 
The Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 
June 19974 in short includes four parts. The first part is about the Council’s 
acknowledgement, at a meeting in Madrid in December 1995, of the extreme importance of 
securing budgetary discipline in stage three of the EMU. It continues with the meeting in 
Dublin in December 1996, where the European Council reached an agreement on the main 
elements of the Stability and Growth Pact.   
The second part regards the member states; They are to respect the medium term budgetary 
objectives and to take the corrective budgetary actions they deem necessary to meet the 
objectives of their stability or convergence programmes, whenever they have information 
indicating expected or actual significant divergence from those objectives or have received 
warnings in the form of Council recommendation. 
The third part regards the European Commission and how they are to prepare and present, 
without any delay, necessary reports, opinions and recommendations to enable the council to 
adopt decisions regarding deficits. They also have to present to the council the reasons why, 
if they find a deficit exceeding 3% of GDP not excessive. 
In the forth part focus is on the Council. It should be committed to a rigorous and timely 
implementation of all the elements of the Stability and Growth Pact and in its competence 
take the necessary decisions regarding deadlines, sanctions and fines. They have to state in 
writing why, if it did not act or follow the Commissions recommendations and in that case 
also make public the member states votes in the matter. 
2.3.2 The two Council regulations 
Council regulation (EC) no. 1467/975 of 7 July 1997, on speeding-up and clarifying the 
implementation of excessive deficit procedures calls for a fiscal discipline. If a participating 
member state does not take efficient actions to correct excessive deficits there will be a time 
period of ten months, counting from the first reports of the deficit until a necessary decision 
regarding sanctions is made, to pressure the member state to take such actions. This 
proceeding will rest if the correct measures are taken but will be set to action again if the 
measures are not realized or are insufficient. A non-interest bearing deposit will be used as a 
discouraging effect and this will, if the excessive deficit is not corrected, turn in to a fee. 
There are some exceptions when the deficits in the public sector shall be considered 
exceeding the reference value by way of exceptions and transient. Inter alia when it is caused 
by some unusual occurrence that is outside of the member states control, caused by a serious 
economic downturn or if the commissions budgetary projections finds that the deficit will 
turn below the reference value after the affection factors has ceased. For the exceeding of the 
reference value to be considered temporary in the case of an economic downturn there has to 
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be a fall in the real GDP of 2% per annum or between 0.75% and 2% of real GDP if there is 
further supporting evidence. 
The other Council regulation, (EC) no. 1466/976 of 7 July 1997, is about the strengthening of 
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies. 
In this regulation there is a part regarding member states that are non-participating in the 
third stage of EMU that will not be mentioned since these states are irrelevant to the subject 
of the paper. 
Every participating member state needs to give the Council and the Commission the 
information necessary for a regular multilateral surveillance through a Stability program. 
According to the regulation (EC) no.1466/976, this should include: 
• A Medium-Term Objective (MTO), close to or exceeding the convergence criteria, 
for its budgetary position and the development of the public sector debt ratio. 
• The main assumptions regarding the expected economic development and economic 
variables relevant for the realization of the stability program. 
• A description of the measures planned or taken to fulfill the target. 
• An analysis of how the changes in the economic assumptions can affect the public 
finances and debt ratio. 
• A yearly renewal of the Stability programs. 
In this regulation the Council is obligated to view whether the medium-term objects in the 
stability programs are realistic. They monitor the implementation of the programs and when 
discovering deviations they give early warning heads-up. If the situation deteriorates they 
will send a recommendation to take immediate action. 
2.3.3 Changes in the Stability and Growth Pact  
With a common goal of reaching the convergence criteria needed to adopt the Euro, in the 
mid- to late 90s the Euro area members made a considerable progress in consolidating their 
fiscal positions. After the year of 1999 the fiscal performances has varied.  
When the economic downturn began in 2001, an increasing number of Member states ran the 
risk of or incurred excessive deficits as their fiscal balances deteriorated. At the same time, 
the ECOFIN council did not always implement the rules and procedures of the Stability and 
Growth Pact in a rigorous manner. This plus an increasing reluctance to follow agreed rules 
and procedures deteriorated the confidence in the EU fiscal framework. 
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Escalating criticism of the Stability and Growth Pact led to intense discussions and proposals 
to reform the Pact. In March 2005 the ECOFIN Council adopted a report regarding proposals 
for improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and the European 
Council soon endorsed this. Changes made in the reformation in 2005 can be seen in the 
table below.  
1. Changes under the preventive arm 
 Before After 
Medium-term objective  
(MTO) 
All member states 
(MS) have a Medium-
term Objective of 
close-to balance-or –
in-surplus 
• Country specific differentiation of MTOs 
according to stock of public debt and 
potential growth. 
• MTOs for the euro area and the ERMII 
MS are set between -1% of GDP and 
balance or surplus (in cyclically-adjusted 
terms and net of one-offs) 
• Implicit liabilities to be taken into account 
at a later stage when modalities for doing 
so are agreed by the Council. 
Adjustment path 
towards the MTO 
No specific provision • MS to take active steps to achieve the 
MTO. 
• Annual minimum adjustment for MS of 
the euro zone or of the ERM-II of 0.5% of 
GDP. 
• The effort should be higher in ´good 
times´. 
• ´Good times´ are identified as periods 
where output exceeds its potential level, 
´taking into account tax elasticises´.  
Early policy advice Early warnings are 
adopted/addressed by 
the Council, upon 
recommendation of the 
Commission. 
In addition, the Commission can issue direct early 
policy advice to encourage MS to stick to their 
adjustment path. 
To be replaced by ‘early warnings’ in accordance 
with the Constitution once applicable. 
Structural reforms No specific provision Reforms will be taken into account when defining 
the adjustment path to the MTO and may allow a 
deviation from it under the following condition: 
• Only major reforms (direct/indirect impact 
on sustainability). 
• Safety margin to the 3% reference value is 
guaranteed; 
• The deficit returns to the MTO within the 
programme period; 
• Detailed information is provided in the 
Stability Convergence Programmes. 
Special attention to systematic pension reforms. 
   
2. Differences in the corrective arm 
 Before After 
Preparing a report 
under Article 104(3) 
No obligation for the 
Commission to prepare 
a report if deficit 
exceed 3%. 
• The Commission will always prepare a 
report in case of a deficit above 3%. 
• The report will examine whether the 
exceptions in Article 104(2) apply. 
• It will account whether the deficit exceeds 
government investment expenditure and 
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all other relevant factors. 
Severe economic 
downturn 
‘Severe economic 
downturn’ if there is an 
annual fall of real GDP 
of at least 2% for the 
preparation of report 
under Article 104(3) 
by the Commission 
and in decisions under 
104(6) by the Council, 
if observations by 
member state 
concerned show that 
the downturn is 
exceptional in light of 
evidence of abruptness 
of the downturn and 
the accumulated loss of 
output with respect to 
past trends. The 
members states 
commit not to invoke 
the severe economic 
downturn when growth 
is above -0.75%.  
An economic downturn may be considered 
‘severe’ in case of a negative growth rate or 
accumulated loss of output during a protracted 
period of very low growth relative to potential 
growth. 
‘Other relevant 
factors’ 
No specific definition 
of ‘ORF’ and their role 
in the excessive deficit 
procedure. 
The Commission report under Article 104(3) will 
take into account: 
• Developments in the medium-term 
economic position (potential growth, 
cyclical conditions, implementation of 
policies); 
• Developments in the medium-term 
budgetary position (public investment, 
quality of public finances as well as fiscal 
consolidation in ’good times’, debt 
sustainability); 
• Any other factor, which in the opinion of 
MS are relevant in order to assess the 
excess over the reference value. 
‘ORF’ will be considered in the steps from Article 
104(4) to (6)) only if the excess over reference 
value is temporary and the deficit remains close to 
reference value. Any deficit above 3% that is 
neither close to the reference value nor temporary 
will be considered excessive. 
 
If the council has decided that an excessive deficit 
exists, the ORF will also be considered in the 
subsequent procedural steps of article 104 (except 
in Article 104(12) i.e. abrogation, and when 
deciding to repeat steps in EDP. 
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Systematic pension 
reforms 
No specific provision • These are treated like an ‘ORF’, but under 
strict conditions also with a role in 
abrogation. 
• Consideration to the net cost of the reform 
will be given regressively for the initial 
five years after a MS has introduced the 
reform (or five years after 2004). 
Increasing the focus 
on debt and 
sustainability 
No specific provision • The debt criterion, and in particular the 
concept of a debt ratio ‘sufficiently 
diminishing and approaching the reference 
value at a satisfactory pace will be applied 
in qualitative terms. 
• The Council will formulate 
recommendations on the debt dynamics in 
its opinions on the stability and 
convergence programmes.  
Extending deadlines 
for taking effective 
action and measures 
 Deadlines are extended: 
• For a decision under 104(6)- from 3 to 4 
months after notification; 
• For taking effective action following 
104(7)- from 4 to 6 months; 
• For moving to 104(9)- from 1 to 2 
months; 
• For taking action following a notice under 
104(9)- from 2 to 4 months. 
Minimum fiscal 
effort 
No specific provision Countries in excessive deficit are required to 
achieve a minimum fiscal effort of at least 0.5% of 
GDP as a benchmark. 
Initial deadline for 
correcting excessive 
deficit 
The excessive deficit 
has to be corrected in 
the year following its 
identification, unless 
there are ‘special 
circumstances’ 
The rule remains; possible extension by 1 year 
based on ‘ORF’ and on the condition that 
minimum fiscal effort has have been taken. 
Repetition of steps in 
EDP 
Not foreseen Deadlines for correcting the Excessive deficit can 
be extended if: 
• Effective action has been taken by MS 
concerned in compliance with the initial 
recommendation notice, and 
• Unexpected adverse economic events with 
major unfavourable budgetary effects 
occur during the correction phase. 
 
Table 22. Source: Lena Frej Ohlsson.Working paper no 268. Statistical implications of the Stability and Growth 
Pact: Creative Accounting and the role of Eurostat, (2007) page 80. 
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3 Italy and the Stability and Growth Pact 2005-2010 
 
In this part we will examine how Italy managed their finances during the period 2005-2010 
and how the Commission and Council implemented the regulations and procedures of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
3.1  Decision regarding excessive deficit 2005 
3.1.1  The Commissions report 
Both in the old and in the reformed SGP, the Commission is supposed to write a report to the 
Council, if the deficit is found to be excessive. It is only in the 2005 reform the Commission 
is obligated to write a report if the deficit is above 3% and to start investigating whether an 
excessive deficit exists. This was the case on the 23 of May 2005 when the Commission 
according to Article 104(3) prepared the report SEC(2005) 750 final18 to the council.  
According to economic statistics from Italy concerning the years 2003 and 2004, the deficit 
had been on the level of 3.1% of GDP and the debt ratio had been around 106-107% of GDP. 
The ISTAT (the Italian Institute of Statistics) made a slightly upward revision of these 
figures and that was enough to provide for the Commission:  
Prima facie evidence of the existence of an excessive deficit in 
Italy in 2003 and 2004, within the meaning of the definitions 
set out in the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
(SEC(2005) 750 final)18 
By this the Commission initiated the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) for Italy. Since the 
2005 reformation their report had to address whether the exceptions in article 104(2) were 
applicable in the case of Italy or if any other relevant factors were to be considered in the 
decision-making if there existed an excessive deficit. 
Could the excessive deficit be exceptional? The rate of economic growth had been low but 
stayed positive during 2003-2004 and if you compared the cyclical slowdown with the rate 
of output, growth was not protracted. The economic growth in Italy had been slow for more 
than a decade due to a number of mutually reinforcing structural weaknesses. Comparing the 
cumulated loss of output relative to potential, it was comparatively small and not at all in the 
same size as in episodes of recession in the past decade. With this in consideration the 
Commission found that the excess over the 3% of GDP reference value was not exceptional 
and that the occurrence of the excessive deficit in Italy did not qualify as a severe economic 
downturn. 
The Commission also found that the excess over reference value was not temporary. The 
deficit had been higher than the reference value during the last two years (2003-2004) and 
the Commission Services spring 2005 forecast had projected an even higher deficit of 3.6% 
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of GDP in 2005 and 4.6% of GDP in 2006. Economic growth was very low and they 
expected a downward revision, which in turn would keep the deficit above the reference 
level in the coming years.  
With the excessive deficit neither exceptional nor temporary the Commission analysis did 
suggest that the requirements concerning the deficit criterion was not fulfilled. 
In the original SGP there were no special provisions regarding debt and sustainability but 
since 2005 there is a focus on the debt criterion and the concept of a debt ratio. This was 
regarded in the Commissions report (EC (2005) 750 final)18 During the two years preceding 
this report the debt to GDP ratio had been 106-107% and that was well above the reference 
value of the Treaty. The pace of the debt reduction had since 2001 slowed down and since 
2003 the debt ratio had practically been standing still. This even though the interest rates had 
reached historically low levels, which made the cost of servicing the debt, reduced. The 
Commission had found an explanatory factor in the shrinking primary surplus, and also in 
the existence of debt-increasing below-the-line operations. If the debt-to-GDP ratio would 
continue to decline in the same average pace as recorded in the years 2001-2004, “it would 
take more than 30 years to approach the 60% Treaty reference value”(EC (2005) 750 final)18 
The Commission’s analysis was suggesting that the treaty requirement concerning the debt 
criterion was not fulfilled. 
In the original SGP resolution and regulations the definition of Other Relevant Factors was 
unclear and likewise was the ORF role in the Excessive deficit procedure. This was thus 
cleared up in the ECOFIN report on 20 march 20051 and there was from that point forward a 
framework, within such relevant factors should be taken into account. Included in that 
framework were: 
1. Medium-term economic position; 
2. Medium-term budgetary position; 
3. Other relevant factors; 
The Commission report contains a detailed declaration of the ORF. Under the Medium-term 
economic position: 
• Cyclical condition and potential growth 
The pace of acceleration of economic growth towards the potential was expected to 
be moderate and the structural reforms implemented so far had given higher 
employment growth but had not increased potential economic growth. There were 
still many structural weaknesses hampering factor efficiency that were still 
unaddressed. There was a need for more ambitious fiscal targets to allow a reduction 
in debt ratio. 
• Recent structural reforms 
In the 1990’s, labor market reforms may have had a positive effect on public finances 
through higher revenue. In 2004 there was a pension reform with no direct budgetary 
costs and in March 2005 the government had tried to increase and improve the 
competitiveness by reforming R&D subsidies and reducing red tape and reforming 
the bankruptcy laws. This would have a budgetary impact calculated approximately 
about less than 0.1% of GDP annually. 
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Under the Medium-term budgetary position: 
• Public investment 
Since 2001 the general government deficit had consistently exceeded gross fixed 
capital formation. 
• Structural deficit 
There was a high level of structural deficit i.e. the deficit net of cyclical factors and 
one-off measures. This showed a lack of fiscal consolidation and the projected level 
of structural deficit did not ensure a decline in debt ratio. 
• Fiscal consolidation efforts in good times 
In 2000 and in 2001, when actual economic growth had been above potential growth 
and the output gap had been positive, the Italian authorities had loosened its fiscal 
position net of both cyclical factors and one-off measures. The Commission therefore 
concluded that: 
The worsening of the structural budgetary position in Italy has 
its roots in the implementation of a strongly pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy in good times and was masked by the heavy recourse to 
temporary revenue increasing and expenditure reducing 
measures. ( EC(2005) 750 final)18  
• Expenditure on education and R&D 
Was in line with EU average 
• Temporary measures 
• Long-term sustainability of public finances 
In the matter of long-term sustainability the Commission was of the opinion that Italy 
appeared at some risk. The effectiveness of the Pension reform that had been 
approved in 2004 was not expected to reduce expenditure before the year 2011 and 
the effectiveness of it remains to be seen.  
To guarantee the respect of the government’s inter-temporal budget constraint, the primary 
net of cyclical factors and one-off measures had a minimum level of 4% of GDP. In Italy the 
projected levels for 2005 and 2006 were around 1% of GDP, if the interest rates would start 
to rise again it could have a significant negative impact on the budget and the long-term 
sustainability of the public finances. 
The ORF was also to be considered and the Commission report (EC (2005) 750 final)18 
regarded four important factors. 
• They found that the budget plans made by Italy had been repeatedly build upon 
overoptimistic assumptions. This had lead to budgetary slippages in implementation. 
• The effectiveness of Italy’s series of initiatives, launched with the goal of controlling 
expenditures had been disappointing. Especially the implementation of these 
initiatives on a regional and local level. 
• There seemed to be a problem in statistical governance. Government data from the 
year 2000 to 2004 had to be revised and Eurostat had not validated the data. 
• There seemed to be a lacking of efficiency in the process leading to the adoption of 
the budget law. 
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With everything taken into consideration the Commission found that Italy did not fulfill the 
debt or deficit criteria and that the consideration of the other factors strengthened their 
conclusion. 
3.1.2 The Commissions opinion 
The Italian government answered the Commission report with a letter, putting forward 
additional factors that they thought was relevant and might change the Commission’s mind 
regarding the fulfilment of the debt and deficit criteria.  
In (SEC(2005) 886 final)8 the Commission stated that before other relevant factors were to 
be taken into account  they needed to find that “the excess of the reference value is 
temporary and the deficit remains close to the reference value.” They found that in the case 
of Italy this condition was not met. Therefore the Commission opinion in accordance with 
Article 104(5) and the council decision in accordance with Article 104(6) found that other 
relevant factors were not to be taken into account. Which meant that the factors Italy had 
brought to the table would not be considered in the assessment.  
The Commission was of the opinion that there was an excessive deficit in Italy and that the 
council should act accordingly in conformity with the SGP. 
3.1.3 The Commissions recommendation 
Seen below is a shortened version of the Commission’s recommendation for a council 
decision 29 of June 2005 (SEC(2005) 916 final)14. 
• The excessive deficit situation in Italy should be put to an end as quickly as possible 
and at the very latest the situation must be changed by 2007 in accordance with 
Article 3(4) of Council regulation (EC) No1467/975. The Council should also 
establish a deadline to the 12 November 2005 for the Italian government to take 
action to change the situation. 
• In 2007 the deficit should be brought under the 3% reference value and this should be 
done in a credible and sustainable manner. With this the Commission meant that the 
Italian authorities should implement, with sternness, the 2005 budget and make sure 
of a cumulative reduction in the deficit of at least 1.6% of GDP over 2006-2007 
comparing with the level in 2005. At least half of the correction should be taking 
place in 2006. 
• There should be further improvement in the collecting and processing general 
government data. 
• The gross debt ratio must be reduced and approach the reference value in a contented 
pace. The Italian government should ensure this by restoring an adequate level of the 
primary surplus and by paying attention to factors other than net borrowing such as 
below-the-line operation.  
 
3.1.4 Council decision 
The Council decided (Council decision 11912/05)21, in accordance with the Council 
regulation (EC) No 1467/975 that there existed special circumstances in the case of Italy and 
the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit was moved from 2006 to 2007.  
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The major reason for the prolonged deadline was Italy’s deep-rooted structural problems that 
had affected the Italian economy since the last decade. The council said that, “The excessive 
deficit needs to be framed within a comprehensive reform strategy” and this off course is not 
made in a day. 
The Council recommended in addition to the Commission’s recommendation that the Italian 
authorities was to ensure budgetary consolidation towards a medium- term position of 
government finances close to balance or in surplus. This was to be done by reducing the 
cyclically adjusted deficit and net of one-off and other temporary measures by at least 0.5% 
of GDP per year after the excessive deficit had been corrected. 
3.1.5 Action taken 
In the follow-up report from the Commission to the Council in 2006 (SEC(2006) 238 
final)10, the Commission seemed to be satisfied with the action taken by Italian authorities. 
Below is a shortened extraction of what Italy had done according to the Commission. 
• Italy appeared to have achieved the 4.3% of GDP target for 2005. 
• Italy had adopted measures in the 2006 budget law that would ensure progress toward 
correcting the excessive deficit within the time limits set by the Council. But, this 
only if the budgetary law was fully implemented and that economic development 
were in line with Council recommendation. 
• Italy had set a nominal deficit target below 3% for 2007 and had planned for a 
structural adjustment that went in line with the Council recommendations for 2007 
and the years following. 
• Italy had planned to return the debt to a declining path with the help of rising primary 
surpluses and a realization of large privatization plans and by scaling back on debt-
increasing below-the-line operations. 
• Italy had taken initiatives to improve the quality of general government data. 
 
The Commission was concerned that the correction of the excessive deficit by its time limit 
and the reduction of the debt ratio were subjects to significant uncertainties. The success of 
the correction and of the reduction relied upon effective implementation. Even though 
concerned the Commission saw no reason for continuing the excessive deficit procedure at 
that time.  
The council agreed with the Commission’s opinion (6917/06 (Presse 64)23 and would 
together with the Commission continue to closely monitor the budgetary developments in the 
light of the fragile situation of public finances to ensure that adequate action was taken. 
In 2008 the Council received a new recommendation (SEC(2008) 574 final)15, regarding 
abrogating Decision 2005/694/EC, from the Commission. During 2006 and 2007 the general 
government deficit had declined reaching 3.4 % of GDP in 2006 and 1.9% of GDP in 2007. 
The report found that the deficit would have been even lower in the absence of one-offs. 
They found that the structural balance had improved. This indicated that the deficit was 
being brought below the ceiling of the 3% of GDP in a sustainable manner. 
The Italian government debt ratio increased by 0.6 percentage points in 2006 but fell in 2007 
to 104% of GDP. The Commission found that the debt ratio had been affected by a 
temporary debt-increasing financial operation in 2006 and its reversal in 2007. If this 
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operation had not occurred, the debt ratio in 2006 should have been relatively stable and 
would have reflected the improvement in the primary surplus that goes hand in hand with 
Council recommendation.  
The 2008 spring forecast showed that the debt ratio would fall even further to around 102.5% 
by 2009, if of course the policies were unchanged. This fall in debt ratio was considered to 
be in line with the correction of the excessive deficit in 2007. 
The Commission found that the excessive deficit situation in Italy had been corrected and 
they thereby recommended the Council to abrogate its decision on the existence of such a 
situation. This was also done in Council Decision (2008/560/EC)20.  
3.2  Decision regarding excessive deficit 2009 
3.2.1 The Commissions report 
Only a little more than a year after the Council Decision (2008/560/EC)20 the Commission 
presented a new report (SEC (2009) 1271 Final)19. The report included a section about the 
current world economic downturn and a section about Italy and whether the criteria of the 
treaty and SGP were fulfilled. 
The economic downturn in 2008 and 2009 had brought about a decline in tax revenues and a 
rising of social benefit expenditure. The European Commission had called for fiscal stimulus 
in the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) in November of 2008; the European 
council had also endorsed this in December the same year. The fiscal stimulus was not to be 
the same for all member states since they had different positions in terms of public finances, 
competiveness and sustainability. The fiscal stimulus was also to be reversed as soon as 
conditions improved again. Because of the economic downturn several countries had taken 
action to stabilize the financial sector. This could effect the debt position and create a larger 
deficit for the countries. 
In 2009 the deficit in Italy was in the April 2009 EDP notification planned to be 3.7% of 
GDP but new projections published in July showed a government deficit of 5.3% of GDP. 
The Commission found that the planned deficit value was well above the 3% of GDP 
reference value and even though it could be qualified as exceptional within the meaning of 
the treaty and the SGP, it could not be considered temporary and this suggested that the 
deficit criterion in the treaty was not fulfilled. 
For 2009 the government debt ratio was planned to be 115.1% of GDP. The planned debt 
ratio was well above the 60% reference value and could not be considered diminishing or 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. This suggested that the debt criterion 
was not fulfilled. 
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The ORF mentioned in the report (SEC (2009) 1271 Final)19 under the medium-term 
economic position are shown in a shortened version below. 
• Cyclical condition and potential growth 
Since the 1990’s the real GDP growth had been low and below the average in the 
euro area. There was a slowdown even before the economic downturn and Italy 
reached a recession in the spring of 2008. Even though the growth estimates were 
influenced by the downturn in 2009, the recovery were likely to be slow because of 
the structural weakness that was the root of the slow productivity dynamics. 
 
The ORF mentioned in the report (SEC (2009) 1271 Final)19 under the medium-term 
budgetary position are shown in a shortened version below. 
• Structural deficit and fiscal consolidations in good times 
During 2006 and 2007 the structural balance i.e. the cyclically adjusted balance and 
net of one-off and other temporary measures improved. This period could be 
qualified as good times in Italian economy. It worsened in 2008 and was expected to 
improve in 2009 only to slightly worsen again in 2010 due to higher interest 
expenditures. The structural balance remained away from the Medium Term 
Objective of a balanced budgetary position. 
• Public investment 
The Commission services spring forecast said that the Italian deficit ratio would 
continue to exceed the public investment ratio in 2009 and in 2010. 
• Quality of public finances 
The high cost of debt service and pension spending were to crowd out more 
productive expenditure as well as other social spending that would have loosened the 
rigidity of Italy’s public spending. 
 
Other factors considered relevant by the Commission are mentioned in the text below. 
Thanks to financing measures, the successive recovery packages taken in response to the 
crisis were not expected to appreciably weigh on the government balance as they were 
planned to have an overall neutral budgetary impact. This was in line with the 
recommendations of the EERP. With Italy’s debt ratio in mind the Commission found the 
successive recovery packages to be an adequate response to the economic downturn. 
Due to a series of measures adopted in late 2008 and early 2009 to ensure the stability of the 
financial system and guaranteeing higher protection for savers and adequate levels of bank 
liquidity and capitalisation, the Ministry of Economy and Finance had been allowed to 
underwrite financial instruments issued by sound listed banks.  
The Council would have liked to see Italy carrying out, with determination, the adjustment 
path planned over the programme period to set the debt ratio on a steadily declining path and 
ensure long-term sustainability of public finances. This because the Council thought that the 
achievement of the deficit targets 2009 to 2011 might be prevented by a lower-than-planned 
economic growth and by possible slippages in the implementation of the planned restraint in 
primary expenditure. 
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On 26 August 2009 the Italian authorities put forward some factors they found relevant in 
accordance with Article 2(3) of council Regulation (EC) No 1467/975. They claimed 
unexpected outlays related to the Abruzzo earthquake, which was around 0.04% of GDP in 
2009 and in 2010. The Italian authorities also put forward the 0.5% of GDP contribution to 
the EU budget and expenses for peacekeeping operations and development aid. Another 
factor mentioned was the one-off public investment in the repurchase of previously 
securitised real estate that cost about 0.1% of GDP 2009. 
The Commission found that even though these factors added relevant information, they did 
not alter the assessment of the debt and deficit criteria presented. 
 
3.2.2 The Commissions opinion 
In Commission Opinion SEC(2009) 1523 final9, the Commission aired its view on the 
existence of an excessive deficit. They found that in the case of Italy the deficit criterion was 
not met, neither was the debt criterion. Other relevant factors were not to be considered since 
the double condition was not met. 
The Commission was of the opinion that there existed an excessive deficit in Italy, and did 
act in accordance with article 104(3) of the Treaty. 
3.2.3 The Commissions recommendation  
Now that there was an opinion that an excessive deficit existed in Italy there was the 
question about the deadline. In the Commission’s recommendation for a council decision 
SEC(2009) 1524 final16, they found that there existed special circumstances in the case of 
Italy and that the deadline should be longer than that under Article 104(7). The Commission 
found that, due to the financial and economic crisis, Italy’s already pressured economic 
situation had worsened. The Italian government in turn had responded to the crisis 
appropriately mindful of the need to avoid substantial deterioration of public finances. 
Measures had been taken to support key industrial sectors and low-income groups, all in line 
with the EERP. These measures taken would have an officially neutral effect on the budget 
since they were fully financed by a reallocation of existing funds. 
The widening of the deficit in 2009 was for most part the result of the automatic stabilizers. 
Italy was expecting a significant contraction both in direct and indirect taxes. One-off capital 
revenues could increase by an extraordinary tax on repatriated assets that were illegally held 
abroad. 
In the February 2009 Stability Program update the primary expenditure was expected to rise 
faster than planned, in 2009 by over 4.5%. Even though budgetary measures adopted 
contained intermediate consumption, it was still increasing. The only significant factor that 
was expected to decrease was the interest expenditures, this due to incredible low market 
interests. The Capital spending in Italy was being raised by around 13% by the bringing 
forward of investment plans. 
With these facts at hand the Commission found it appropriate that a correction of the 
excessive deficit should be in a medium-term framework and must be completed by the year 
2012.  
 17 
3.2.4 Council decision  
On January 10, 2010 there was a publication (2010/286/EU)26, of the Council decision 
regarding Italy in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
The Council found that the existing deficit was not close to the reference value. The excess 
could not be considered temporary but could be qualified as exceptional due to the financial 
crisis. They found that Italy did not meet the deficit criteria. 
The Commission services’ autumn 2009 report projected that the Italian government debt 
was to rise from 115.1% to 117.8% in 2011. The debt ratio was not diminishing sufficiently 
or moving towards the reference value at a satisfactory pace, which was needed to fulfil the 
debt criterion of the SGP and the Treaty. 
Relevant factors should be taken into account if the double criterion was fulfilled: that deficit 
remains close to the reference value and that the excessive deficit is temporary. In this case 
the Council found that the double criterion was not fulfilled. The other relevant factors 
would not be taken into account in the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. 
After the overall assessment the council was in the opinion that there existed an excessive 
deficit in Italy. 
3.2.5 The Council recommendation 
On 2 December 2009 the Council had reached a decision that there was an excessive deficit 
in Italy in accordance with Article 104(6). The council found that there were special 
circumstances and that the deadline for correction should be allowed in a medium-term 
framework. 
In Recommendation SEC (2009) 1525 final17, for a Council recommendation, the following 
was suggested; 
• The Council found that Italy’s budgetary position in 2009 for the most part was a 
result of automatic stabilizers and measures taken in response to the economic 
downturn and therefore the deadline for a correction of the excessive deficit was 
prolonged to 2012. 
• The general government deficit should be brought below 3% of GDP in a medium-
term framework. This should be performed in a sustainable and credible way by; 
1. Implementing the budgetary measures as planned 2010. 
2. Ensuring structural budgetary adjustment of 0.5 PP of GDP annually over the years 2010-
2012. This should also help restore an adequate level of primary surplus and thereby lower 
the debt ratio. 
3. Specifying the measures necessary for achieving the correction of the excessive deficit by 
its set deadline. If the budgetary and or economic conditions turns out to be better than 
expected Italy should speed up the process of the reduction of the deficit. 
• The Council recommended the Italian authorities to seize every opportunity beyond 
the structural adjustment to speed up the process of debt reduction. 
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• The Italian government had a deadline to June 2, 2010 to take effective action to 
implement the fiscal measures in 2010 as planned. They also had to outline the 
measures that would be needed for a correction of the deficit. The Commission 
services’ autumn forecast would in their assessment take into account whether 
effective action had been taken. 
The Council also invited the Italian authorities to increase the efforts in; 
• Strengthening competition in product and service markets. 
• Simplifying legislation. 
• At all levels, reducing the administrative burden. 
• Improving the functioning of the labour market and the efficiency outcomes and 
standards of the education system. 
• Trying to reduce regional disparities. 
Italy was also invited to implement reforms in order to raise potential GDP growth. This 
would include reforms conducive to enhancing the quality of public finances and strengthen 
further the enforceable nature of the medium-term budgetary framework. They should in an 
efficient manner implement mechanisms to monitor and control expenditure and improve 
composition and effectiveness of spending. They should also develop the framework for 
forthcoming fiscal federalism in such a manner that it completely supports these objectives. 
When the final Council recommendation for Italy came (15757/09)22 there was no major 
divergence in opinion from the initial one.  
3.2.6 Action taken 
The Commission, in a communication to the Council (COM (2010) 329)11, did the follow-up 
of the action taken by the Italian government to correct the excessive deficit. They found that 
the outlook for the Italian economy in the near future had not changed significantly since the 
Commission Services’ autumn 2009 forecast, which underpinned the council 
recommendation. The fiscal package for 2009 to 2011 was adopted in summer 2008 and with 
that measures aiming for a restraint in expenditures and underlying the 2010 deficit target.  
The 2010 deficit ratio was targeted to decrease by 0.3%, from 5.3% of GDP in 2009 to 5% of 
GDP in 2010. 
In the 2010 budget, additional measures were taken to support low-income workers and 
health and social expenditures as well as military missions abroad. The cost of 0.4% of GDP 
was claimed by the authorities to be fully financed mainly through the one-off revenues from 
the extraordinary tax on illegally expatriated assets. 
Italy’s budget strategy for 2010 could be assessed to be in line with the Council 
recommendation, but it has also some additional measures that imply some deviation. 
According to the Commission Services spring 2010 forecast, the structural deficit was going 
to improve by 0.25 PP. of GDP in 2010. This was a smaller improvement than the annual 
fiscal effort of 0.5 PP. of GDP recommended under Article 126(7). 
To reach the deficit target of below 3% of GDP by 2012 the authorities had targeted a 
gradual reduction. The efforts to achieve the gradual target of 3.9% of GDP in 2011 would 
be doubled. 
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A decree law that specifies the measures that underpin the additional consolidation efforts 
for 2011 to 2012 had been adopted on 25 May 2010. These measures included cuts in 
expenditure, half of which was to be borne by local authorities, restraint in wages and 
recruitment throughout the public sector and cuts to ministerial expenditure and the 
postponement by some months to retirement for those meeting seniority conditions. 
Tax evasion would be fought stronger and was expected to yield higher revenues, 0.1% of 
GDP in 2011 and 0.5% of GDP in 2012. 
In the Council opinion of 26 of April 2010 they saw some risks to Italy’s medium-term 
budgetary strategy, these were also addressed with the downward revision of the growth 
assumptions. However the Commission found that the deficit outcomes in the entire period 
could still be worse than targeted. 
The Combined Report on the Economy and Public Finances (RUEF) contained an upward 
revision of the debt projections 2010 to 2012. The revision was caused by the 2009 higher 
starting position because of a lower nominal GDP growth and a less favourable stock-flow 
adjustment development. The projected decline in debt ratio occurs one year later than in the 
Stability Program. 
On the information given, the Commission found that Italy had taken adequate action for a 
correction of the excessive deficit within its time limit. Especially the consolidation 
measures in 2010, which were being broadly implemented as recommended by the Council. 
The Commission was of the opinion that there were no need for any further steps in the EDP 
at present, but they would continue to monitor Italy’s budgetary developments in accordance 
with the Treaty and the SGP. 
In Press release 12076/1024, the Council shared the view of the Commission regarding the 
action taken by Italy to correct the excessive deficit and found likewise that no additional 
steps in the Excessive deficit procedure was necessary at this stage. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
During the entire period 2005 to 2010, Italy has failed to reach the deficit reference value 
and the debt to GDP reference value. The Commission and Council have also acted on Italy 
in accordance with the regulations and procedures of the SGP. 
In the reports, opinions, recommendations and decisions you can see that the reforms made 
in the SGP in 2005 are well-used and important tools in the decision-making whether there 
exists an excessive deficit. Below are examples of some of the major changes and 
clarifications made in the reform 2005 that are used in the decision-making; 
• In the reports from 2005 and 2009 you will find long explications of the ORF. The 
developments in Medium-term budgetary position, Medium-term economic position 
and other factors relevant for Italy, are examined. There are also discussions and later 
conclusions, whether the excess value is temporary and if the deficit remains close to 
the reference value. This is done to clarify if the factors mentioned above even should 
be taken into consideration in the decision of an existence of an excessive deficit. 
• There is a focus on debt sustainability and both in 2005 and 2009 the Commission 
and Council were watching to see if the debt to GDP ratio was sufficiently 
diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.  If so, though 
not in the case of Italy, the debt criterion would have been accepted. 
• The recommendations include a MTO adjustment of 0.5% of GDP annually and also 
an expectation that there in good times are taken higher efforts towards the correction 
of the excessive deficit. 
If the reform of the SGP in 2005 never took place, had Italy been acted on in a different 
manner? The closest you can get to an answer to that question without viewing and 
analyzing the reports from before 2005, is maybe. The ORF and their role in the excessive 
deficit procedure, has no specific definition in the unreformed SGP. This means that the 
Commission and the Council might have found them relevant and considered them even 
though the excess value was not considered temporary and the deficit value was not close to 
the reference value. Without the clarification and guidelines it is hard to decide what to take 
into account. But even so, their conclusion might as well have been the same as the ones 
made after the reformation.  If we look at the debt criterion I find it hard to see that it could 
be anything than unfulfilled regardless if the decision was made before or after the 
reformation of the SGP. Italy’s debt ratio has been well above the reference value for a long 
time. But then again I cannot be 100% sure. One thing that can be said is that if an excessive 
deficit were found, the deadline for its correction would have been prolonged by a year 
regardless if the decision were made before or after the reformation. This due to that the 
Council still would have found special circumstances in the deep-rooted structural problems 
of Italy. 
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